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Special 301 and Taiwan: A Case Study of
Protecting United States Intellectual
Property in Foreign Countries
Y. Kurt Chang
On April 30, 1993, the United States Trade Representative
(USTR) placed Taiwan on the "priority watch list" of countries that
failed to protect United States intellectual property rights.' Although
countries on the priority watch list are not as egregious in violating
United States intellectual property rights as those identified as "prior-
ity foreign countries," Taiwan was targeted for an immediate action
plan, requiring it to take specific actions before July 31, 1993, or else
risk being the subject of a trade sanction.2 Under the intense pressure
from the United States, the ruling party of Taiwan rammed through
the legislature the first law governing the island's booming cable-tele-
vision industry on July 16, 1993.1
The authority of the USTR to target trading partners of the
United States for their unsatisfactory protection of United States in-
tellectual property rights comes from the Special 301 provision of the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.4 The Special 301
provision is designed to use the threat of unilateral retaliation by the
United States to pressure its trade partners to reform their currently
deficient intellectual property practices. The idea is the carrot and the
stick, where the carrot is the right to export to the United States as a
most favored nation, and the stick is the trade sanction.
To understand the pros and cons of using Special 301, a case study
seems better than general discussion based only on general legal and
1 USTR Fact Sheet on Special 301, Apr. 30,1993, reprinted in 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 761
(May 5, 1993).
2 Id.
3 Taiwan Optimistic on New TV Law, But Foreign Ownership Ban Concerns U.S., Int'l Bus.
& Fin. Daily (BNA) (July 29, 1993).
4 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107
(1988) (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
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political principles which can be too vague and abstract. Looking at a
real case helps to flesh out the arguments and facilitates more reason-
able evaluation of the effectiveness of Special 301. In a paper pub-
lished in 1989-90,1 the Administration's implementation of Special
301 was appraised as a "ten strike," and the application of Special 301
was called "artful." It will be interesting to see whether four years
later those praises are still pertinent, at least in the case under study.
Taiwan is an interesting case for many reasons. Even before the
passage of Special 301 Taiwan has been under the close scrutiny of the
United States for its deficient protection of United States intellectual
property rights. Ranked the fourteenth largest exporter in the world,
Taiwan is not a member of United Nations, not a signatory to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT),6 and not diplomat-
ically recognized by most developed countries. As a rapidly develop-
ing country, Taiwan has many social, political and economic problems.
Some of those problems are unique to Taiwan, but many of them are
common to all developing countries. This paper will trace and analyze
the interaction between the United States and Taiwan in the process
of resolving disputes on intellectual property protection, and will dis-
cuss the implications of Taiwan's experience, which can be useful for
understanding conflicts over intellectual property protection in other
countries.
Part I of this paper discusses the statutory requirements of Spe-
cial 301, and the reason why such a law was enacted. Part I also con-
sists of a review of the general conflicts between developed and
developing countries over the protection of intellectual property
rights. Part II begins with a short review of Taiwan's economic and
political developments, then gives a review of how the United States
has applied Special 301 on Taiwan, and a closer look at certain
changes Taiwan has made in response to the Special 301 threat. Part
III contains a discussion of the problems of Special 301's application,
and a discussion of protecting intellectual property rights through the
GAT.
As the case study of Taiwan will make clear, the real problem of a
statute like Special 301 lies in its unilateral nature. This paper sug-
gests that the United States should stop its aggressive use of the threat
of unilateral trade retaliation under Special 301 as the main means to
5 Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, "Special 301". Its Requirements, Implementation and
Significance, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 259 (1989-90).
6 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,55 U.N.T.S. 187.
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enforce United States intellectual property rights in other countries.
Instead, the United States should use multilateral means such as that
provided by the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPs) agreement in the GATT for the protection of United States
intellectual property rights in foreign countries.7
I. SPECIAL 301 AND PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RiGirrs IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES
A. What is Special 301?
Special 301, as certain provisions in the Omnibus Trade and Com-
petitiveness Act of 1988 (Trade Act of 1988) are called, is aimed at
protecting United States intellectual property rights in foreign coun-
tries. The Trade Act of 1988 expressly finds that the "international
protection of intellectual property rights is vital to the international
competitiveness of United States persons that rely on protection of
intellectual property rights."' It further stresses that United States
businesses that rely on intellectual property rights must be ensured
fair and equitable market access in foreign countries in order to pro-
tect the economic interests of the United StatesY
The purpose of Special 301 is to provide for the development of
an overall strategy to ensure that intellectual rights and market access
for those who rely on such rights will be adequately and effectively
protected. Under Special 301, within 30 days after the issuance of the
National Trade Estimate (NTE) Report, the USTR has to identify
those foreign countries that deny "adequate and effective protection
of intellectual property rights," 10 or deny "fair and equitable market
access to United States persons who rely upon intellectual property
rights protection."' 1 The USTR is further required to name as "prior-
ity foreign countries" those countries whose acts, practices or policies
are the most onerous or egregious, and have the greatest adverse eco-
nomic impact on the United States,' 2 and that are not entering into
good faith negotiations or making significant progress in bilateral or
multilateral negotiations to provide adequate and effective protection
of intellectual property rights.'3
7 See infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
8 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 1303(a)(1)(A).
9 Id. § 1303(a)(1)(B).
10 19 U.S.C. § 2242(a)(1)(A) (1988).
11 19 U.S.C. § 2242(a)(1)(B).
12 19 U.S.C. § 2242(b)(1)(A).
13 19 U.S.C. § 2242(b)(1)(B).
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Within thirty days after the USTR identifies "priority foreign
countries," the USTR must initiate investigations into the acts, prac-
tices, or polices of those "priority countries."1 4 The USTR has only
six months (with possible three months extension) to complete the
investigation and to seek to negotiate bilateral solutions.'5 If the acts,
practices and polices continue after the investigation period, the
USTR is authorized, but not required, to retaliate in the form of eco-
nomic sanction. 16 The USTR also has the discretion not to initiate a
Special 301 investigation if such investigation would be detrimental to
United States economic interests. 7
Retaliation ranges from withdrawal of trade concession to in-
creasing duties or import restrictions. 18 Trade sanction under Special
301 has powerful and disruptive effects because it can be directed
against any industry in the infringing country, regardless of whether
that industry is involved in the piracy of American intellectual
properties.' 9
B. How the USTR Implements Special 301
There is currently a three-tier priority system for the implementa-
tion of Special 301 requirements.2" Countries may be identified as
"priority foreign countries" pursuant to Special 301, or be put on the
"priority watch list" or the "watch list". A country on the "priority
watch list" is given one hundred fifty days to pursue accelerated ac-
tions plans, and its progress over the one hundred fifty-day period is
reviewed to determine whether it should be identified as a priority
country.2 '
Since 1988, many countries have been listed in this three-tier sys-
tem.' Although most of those countries are developing countries, de-
veloped countries such as Japan and Germany have been targeted. In
1993, Brazil, India, and Thailand were identified as "priority foreign
14 19 U.S.C § 2412(b)(2)(A).
15 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a)(3)(A)-(B).
16 19 U.S.C. § 2416(b).
17 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(2)(B)(iv).
18 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(1).
19 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(3).
20 USTR Fact Sheet on Special 301, May 25, 1989, reprinted in 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 715
(May 31, 1989).
21 Id.
22 See USTR Fact Sheet on Special 301, supra note 1.
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countries." Ten countries were placed on the "priority watch list,"23
among which Taiwan and Hungary were required to complete "imme-
diate action plans" by July 31, 1993. Seventeen countries were placed
on the "watch list."24
Under the threat of unilateral trade sanction, many countries
targeted by Special 301 enacted new intellectual property laws or up-
graded their enforcement of intellectual property laws. The Clinton
Administration, however, does not seem satisfied with the rate im-
provements were made in those countries, and intends to use Special
301 more aggressively. The Fact Sheet on April 31, 1993,25 pro-
claimed that "the Administration is committed to giving a fresh direc-
tion to the Special 301 review process to ensure that its objectives are
clear and that other countries know what we expect.... The Clinton
Administration is determined to ensure that foreign countries provide
high levels of protection and that it solves particular problems to the
satisfaction of the [United States] intellectual property community"
(emphasis added). The Fact Sheet also stated that the Clinton Admin-
istration will not let countries take up permanent residence on any of
the Special 301 lists. To this end, "immediate action plans" and "out-
of-cycle" reviews are used, which marks a departure from prior Spe-
cial 301 enforcement. Ambassador Kantor, the USTR, will instruct an
interagency team of government experts to initiate "immediate action
plans" that will include deadlines and benchmarks for evaluating a
country's performance. 26 The Fact Sheet also indicated the strong in-
fluence of private industrial organizations on the policy and actions of
the USTR in the implementation of Special 301.27
23 Supra note 1. The ten countries on the 1993 priority watch list are Taiwan, Hungary,
Argentina, Egypt, Korea, Poland, Turkey, Australia, the European Community, and Saudi
Arabia.
24 Supra note 1. The countries on the 1993 watch list are Cyprus, Italy, Pakistan, Spain,
Venezuela, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador. El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Indonesia, Ja-
pan, Peru, Philippines, and United Arab Emirates.
25 Supra note 1.
26 Supra note 1.
27 Supra note 1. "The measures announced today result from close consultations with af-
fected industry groups and Congressional leaders, and demonstrate the Administration's com-
mitment to utilize all available venues to pursue resolution of the intellectual property issues. In
issuing the announcement, Ambassador Kantor is expressing the Administration's resolve to
take uniformly strong actions under the Special 301 provisions of the Trade Act. The inter-
agency group that advises the USTR on implementation of Special 301 obtains information from
the private sector, American embassies abroad, the United States' trading partners, and the
NTE report." Id.
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C. Why Does the United States Use Special 301?
1. Why has intellectual property protection become an important
trade issue?
As one of the most advanced countries in the world, the structure
of United States industry is shifting away from manufacturing and to-
ward high technology and service. Intellectual property, which covers
patents, trademarks, copyrights, and new technologies such as com-
puter software and semiconductor masks, has become a major compo-
nent of international trade and United States competitiveness.
Whether one considers movies, music, computer software, or chemi-
cal processes, the United States continues to be among the world's
largest producer of new and valuable intellectual properties.
This competitive advantage of the United States, however, has
been undermined by intellectual property piracy in foreign countries.
Due to the intangibility and public good nature of intellectual proper-
ties, protection of intellectual property rights in foreign countries
poses especially difficult problems. Books, audio-video tapes, com-
puter software can be copied at low cost; patents, trademarks and
know-how can be misappropriated easily. American exporters heavily
reliant upon intellectual property, such as computer, entertainment,
and pharmaceutical industries, have been frustrated by both legiti-
mate competition and proliferating piracy.
The trade deficit and budget deficit make the United States more
concerned about the loss of profit due to violation of intellectual prop-
erty rights in foreign countries. 2s Intellectual property piracy not only
contributes to the trade deficit, but also translates into lost jobs in the
United States.29 Much of the piracy can be traced to several nations
with which the United States has significant trade deficits, such as Ja-
pan, Korea and Taiwan.3" Linking the piracy problem to the deficits
that exist with these highly visible trading partners has provided
28 The overall merchandise trade deficit of the United States in 1993 was 115.77 billion dol-
lars. Years Trade Deficit Widened. December's shrank, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 8, 1994, at D4.
29 A 1988 report estimated that foreign counterfeiters had cost the between 43 and 61 billion
dollars a year. Foreign Protection of Intellectual Property Rights and the Effect on U.S. Trade and
Industry, USITC Pub. 2065, Inv. No. 332-TA-245, at Appendix H (Feb. 1988).
30 Taiwan's trade surplus with the United States in 1992 was 9.4 billion dollars, a decline
from a peak of 19 billion dollars in 1987. See U.S. Set To Take Tough Measures Over Trade,
SouTH CHmNA MORNING PosT, Feb. 22,1993, available in Nexis, World Library, ALLWLD File.
Both Taiwan and Korea are on the 1993 priority watch list, and Japan is on the watch list. See
supra notes 24-25.
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Washington with a politically appealing way to address the trade
imbalances.3'
Another concern about intellectual property piracy in other coun-
tries is its negative effect on the incentive of United States industries
to produce intellectual property. The denial of international intellec-
tual property rights is not only harmful to the economic interests of
the United States, it undermines the creativity, invention, and invest-
ment that are essential to economic and technological growth. 2 The
United States has recognized that foreign governments' tolerance of
piracy in their countries of foreign intellectual property rights may
constitute a non-tariff barrier with trade distortion effects. Since
many developing countries which tolerate considerable intellectual
property piracy also depend heavily on the United States market for
exports, the United States created a trade policy in the mid-1980's that
conditions continued market access on improved intellectual property
rights enforcement regimes. In 1986, a United States White Paper set
out a multifaceted approach to implement this policy.33 The paper
called for the United States to (1) work through multilateral forums to
promote world-wide intellectual property rights protection, (2) pursue
vigorous programs of bilateral consultations to obtain "adequate and
effective" protection for all forms of intellectual property rights, and
(3) work to ensure that United States domestic law provides a higher
standard of protection.'
Following the directions identified in the White Paper, the United
States enacted Special 301 in 1988. At the same time, the United
States insisted on the incorporation of intellectual property issues into
the agenda of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations.35 Because
the Uruguay Round had not reached conclusion until very recently,
Special 301 has been the main measure for the United States to attack
intellectual property piracy in foreign countries. From the United
States perspective, there are distinct advantages to using bilateral ne-
gotiations. Bilateral negotiations can target practices of a particular
country offensive to United States interests and do so in an expedi-
tious manner. For instance, the USTR can tell a country directly what
31 William P. Alford, Forum: Taiwan and the GAT: Panel Three: Intellectual Property,
Trade and Taiwan: a GATT-Fly's View, 1992 COLuM. Bus. L. REv. 97, 99 (1992).
32 USTR Fact Sheet on Special 301, supra note 21.
33 The White Paper was called "Administration Statement on the Protection for U.S. Intel-
lectual Property Rights Abroad." See Summary of the Phase II Recommendations of the Task
Force on Intellectual Property to the Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations (Mar. 1986).
34 Id.
35 See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
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the United States wants it to do in the form of an "immediate action
plan." In an immediate action plan, the United States sets out not
only the deadline, but also the benchmarks for evaluating the progress
of that country.36
2. International Treaties on Intellectual Property Rights
There are good reasons why the United States in 1988 chose to
enact Special 301, which resorts to bilateral negotiations, instead of
using then existing multilateral treaties for intellectual property
protection.
There are three major intellectual property rights treaties gov-
erned by two United Nations institutions: The World Intellectual
property Organization (WIPO) and the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). WIPO administers
the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of
1883, as amended, and the Berne Convention for the protection of
Literary and Artistic Work of 1886, as amended. UNESCO oversees
the Universal Copyright Convention of 1952 (UCC). The Paris Con-
vention governs patents, trademarks and other industrial properties,
while the Berne Convention and UCC deal with copyrights. The
United States withdrew from UNESCO in 1984 and joined the Berne
Convention in 1989. 37
From the United States perspective, the Conventions have signifi-
cant drawbacks. They fail to provide adequate substantive norms cov-
ering important subject matters.38 Besides traditional exclusion of
certain areas of intellectual property, incorporation of important new
technologies has also lagged due to the blocking by developing coun-
tries. The conventions also fail to provide flexible dispute resolution
mechanisms to resolve disputes when member states do not meet their
treaty obligations.39 The WIPO is unable to develop effective en-
forcement mechanisms due to the fact that developing countries con-
stitute an overwhelming majority.4"
36 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
37 See Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a
New Multilateralism, 76 IowA L. REv. 273, 293 n.95 (1991).
38 Id. at 293.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 294; USTR Fact Sheet on Special 301, supra note 21.
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D. Conflicts Between Developed Countries and Developing
Countries Over Intellectual Property Protection
Although Special 301 may be used on any of the trading partners
of the United States, Special 301 has been mainly applied to develop-
mng countries, such as Thailand, Brazil, and Taiwan.41 Looking at the
records of Special 301 negotiations between those developing coun-
tries and the United States, the question that naturally arises is why it
is so difficult to make those developing nations strengthen their intel-
lectual property protection. The difficulty stems from the fact that
developing countries hold very different views of intellectual property
rights protection from those of developed nations.
The United States and other developed countries, as well as many
business associations, have rigorously touted to developing nations the
benefits of adopting Western standards for protecting intellectual
property. The benefits are the fostering of local intellectual property
production and the increased willingness of foreign intellectual prop-
erty owners to transfer technology to the developing country. To the
ears of the developing countries, however, those arguments have a
hollow, self-serving ring to them, especially when the developing
countries have to pay the bill for protecting the rights of foreigners at
the expense of the indigenous population. Although the benefits of
strong intellectual property protection may be apparent in the long
run, to many, the benefits of weak protection appear to outweigh the
costs. Without access to information the immediate economic devel-
opment may be jeopardized.
As consumers of intellectual property, certain developing coun-
tries see little to gain from vigorously protecting intellectual property.
A study by the United Nations showed that developed countries held
95 percent of the patents issued by developing countries, of which 90
percent were never utilized in the host states.4 2 The developing coun-
tries charge that the Western-created intellectual property rights re-
gime serves only to levy an unjust royalty on their technology
development. The developing countries tend to argue that stringent
intellectual property protection will make it more costly to obtain the
technologies necessary for their developments. The developing coun-
tries are also concerned that establishing high standards of protection
for intellectual property rights would allow the business enterprises of
41 See USTR Fact Sheet on Special 301, supra note 1.
42 U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, THE ROLE OF THE PATENT SYSTEM IN
THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOoY TO DEVELOPING CouNTRIEs at 38-40, U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC,
U.N. Sales No. E.75.II.D.6 (1975).
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advanced countries to monopolize technology and to exploit unfairly
the enterprises of less advanced countries.
Some of those concerns of developing countries are valid. It is
wrong, however, for a developing country to refuse to improve its
grossly inadequate intellectual property protection just for the sake of
stealing the fruit of research and development by intellectual property
owners in advanced countries. Foreign intellectual property owners
have the right to be compensated for the use of their work. Further-
more, the developing country itself will be victimized in two ways.
First, local intellectual property owners will also suffer from the
piracy. By condoning piracy, the developing country destroys the in-
centive for indigenous creation of intellectual property. Second, ab-
sent adequate intellectual property protection, companies from
developed countries will be reluctant to transfer technology to the de-
veloping country. The free-riding attitude therefore condemns a de-
veloping country to perpetual second-class status.
On the other hand, it is arguably wrong for an advanced country
to force its intellectual property rights regime on less developed coun-
tries to maximize its profits. Different countries exist in different
stages of economic and technological development. Intellectual prop-
erty standards developed by an advanced country might not fit the
needs of a developing country. For example, a developing country
that wants to develop its manufacturing industry may decide to limit
the term of a patent grant to ten years instead of the United States
standard of seventeen years. Another consideration is the administra-
tive cost of maintaining a system of strong intellectual property pro-
tection. A developing country is unlikely to be enthusiastic about
keeping an expensive intellectual property system just to benefit for-
eign owners.
Unfortunately, developing countries and developed countries are
often not willing to see the problem from the other's angle. The result
is that developed countries see an intellectual property system not up
to their standards as little more than piracy, while developing nations
see restrictions on the use of intellectual property as little more than
an effort by the rich to charge them for knowledge, and so to keep
them impoverished.
Northwestern Journal of
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II. TAIWAN AND ITS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION
UNDER SPECIAL 301
A. The political and economic aspects of Taiwan
As a nation of twenty-one million people on an island the size of
Lake Michigan, Taiwan rose from relative poverty to become the
world's fourteenth largest trading nation. The development of Taiwan
is a history of industrial transformation. Before 1949, rice and sugar
were its main exports. After political separation from mainland China
in 1949, a structural shift from an agricultural economy to an indus-
trial one was phased in. At the initial stage, labor-intensive industries
were encouraged. Light industries, such as textiles, shoes, and toys
were gradually developed. Later, capital-intensive industries, such as
electronics and machinery, were developed. Most recently, a com-
puter industry is rapidly growing. The wealth of Taiwan comes from
exporting. Taiwan is over-populated and resource poor. Its small-
scale island economy needs foreign technology, capital and markets.
After forty years of integration into global capitalism, the foreign
trade share of Taiwan's gross national product has increased from
twenty-three percent in 1952 to ninety-two percent in 1988. 41
As Taiwan became a newly industrialized country (NIC), it found
that it could no longer rely on labor-intensive industries to maintain
its prosperity. Taiwan has been forced to hand over low-value added
manufactures to the second-tier Asian NICs, and needs to switch to
higher value-added industries. To systematically upgrade its economic
structure, Taiwan is undertaking a hefty "Six Year National Develop-
ment Plan, 1991-1996," which requires three hundred and three billion
dollars in funding.
Taiwan's trade is heavily concentrated on the United States and
Japan. In 1988, 26.2 percent of Taiwan's imports were from the
United States, which account for 3.8 percent of United States exports;
38.7 percent of its exports were to the United States, which account
for 5.6 percent of United States imports.' Most of Taiwan's trade
surplus has been earned from the United States, constituting about 90
percent of its foreign currency reserves. The interdependency be-
tween the United States and Taiwan is overwhelmingly asymmetric in
favor of the United States, even if diplomacy and politics are not con-
43 Chih-Cheng Li, The Production of Intellectual Property Rights as a Strategic Component of
the Republic of China's Policy (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kansas).
44 Id. at 35.
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sidered. This trade dependence makes Taiwan extremely susceptible
to the threat of trade sanctions from the United States.
In spite of its strength in international trade, Taiwan is politically
isolated. In 1971 Taiwan lost its "China seat" in the United Nations to
mainland China. Most developed nations, including the United
States, do not recognize Taiwan.45 Diplomatic isolation has forced
Taiwan to undertake a so-called "substantive diplomacy" to circum-
vent the diplomatic siege. It is generally believed that accelerating
market openness to foreigners was the best defense for Taiwan's se-
curity, and maintaining good economic and trade relations with its
trade partners was the best diplomatic strategy. Trade thus has be-
come the center of Taiwan's substantive foreign relations.
Lying ahead in the 1990's are two challenges for Taiwan: trade
tension relief with the United States and economic upgrading. The
protection of intellectual property rights is a strategic component of
Taiwan's new economic policy.46
B. How Special 301 has been used on Taiwan
The United States started bilateral negotiations with Taiwan on
intellectual property protection problems in 1983. Because Taiwan is
not recognized by the United States, all United States-Taiwan negotia-
tions are held through unofficial agencies. The American Institute in
Taiwan represents the United States, and the Coordination Council
for North American Affairs represents Taiwan. Also due to the lack
of a formal diplomatic relationship, the agreements reached through
negotiations have to be enacted into law to take effect.
Before 1983, the intellectual property laws in Taiwan were criti-
cized for their limited scope of recognition and protection of intellec-
tual property rights, inadequate deterrence for infringements, and
protectionist provisions. Foreign entities were denied national treat-
ment, and unrecognized foreign entities often were denied protection
of their intellectual property rights as well as standing to seek redress.
Since 1983, partly due to the external pressure from the United
States, Taiwan began a series of significant reforms to its intellectual
property laws. Step by step, Taiwan has modified its intellectual prop-
erty laws to approach the standards of developed countries. For in-
stance, the 1986 Patent Law Amendment extended protection to both
45 Taiwan has applied agricultural diplomacy to aid a lot of less developed nations since the
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products and processes of chemicals and pharmaceuticals, and the re-
cent 1989 amendment recognized the patentability of micro-orga-
nisms.4 7 The 1985 Amendment of Copyright law expanded protection
to all kinds of literal, scientific, and artistic works, including computer
software and soundtracks. Unrecognized foreign entities now are al-
lowed to bring actions against infringers of their intellectual property
rights, based on treaty or factual reciprocity.'
Since the enactment of Special 301 in 1988, Taiwan has been con-
tinuously under the threat of a Special 301 retaliation. In 1989 Taiwan
was listed on the "priority watch list."49 Taiwan agreed to expedi-
tiously resolve copyright problems concerning motion pictures, and
concluded with the United States an agreement on the protection and
enforcement of rights in audio-visual works.
In 1992 Taiwan was named a priority foreign country.50 A Mem-
orandum of Understanding related to intellectual property rights pro-
tection was signed between the United States and Taiwan on June 5,
1992,51 which called for Taiwan's legislature to approve a cable televi-
sion law, as well as revisions to the copyright, patent, and trademark
laws. In 1992 Taiwan passed a new copyright law and promulgated
regulations for implementing the new law. Taiwan also passed a Fair
Trade Law that provides some protection for trade secrets.
In April 1993 Taiwan's legislature approved a Bilateral Copyright
Agreement and amended Taiwan's copyright law to prohibit parallel
importation.52 Taiwan also passed an amendment raising the rate of
conversion of intellectual property rights violation jail terms to fines.53
On April 30, 1993, Taiwan was again listed on the "priority watch
list."54 This time the United States required Taiwan to implement an
47 ld.
48 Id.
49 USTR Fact Sheet on Special 301, supra note 21.
50 See U.S., Taiwan Reach Key Agreement on Patent, Trademarks, Copyrights, reprinted in 9
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1001 (June 10, 1992).
51 Memorandum of Understanding Between The Coordination Council For North American
Affairs and The American Institute in Taiwan, June 5, 1992 (on file with author).
52 USTR Fact Sheet on Special 301, Apr. 30,1993, reprinted in 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 761
(May 5, 1993). See also infra, notes 59-61, 66-67 and accompanying text.
53 Id.
54 id. "[The U.S.] admitted that Taiwan had taken positive steps in its protection of copy-
rights by approving a bilateral copyright agreement and amending its law to ban unauthorized
parallel imports of copyrighted works. Taiwan has also committed to implement specific im-
provements by July 1 in its export licensing system for computer software and compact discs.
Nonetheless, significant problems remain and the U.S. has presented Taiwan with an "immediate
action plan" to address problems in the level of protection for intellectual property rights and
market access for U.S. audiovisual products. We continue to have serious intellectual enforce-
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"immediate action plan" before July 31, 1993. Taiwan responded by
passing the Cable Television Law on July 16, 1993.11 The Taiwanese
government also announced that it would institute a new program to
improve intellectual property rights protection beginning July 1,
1993.56 The program, known as the "Comprehensive Action Plan for
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights," has a stated purpose of
setting a standard for Taiwan to upgrade its industry, establish itself
as a modern nation, and to conclusively eliminate friction with its
trading partners over intellectual property. The plan lists key points
of action, measures to put those points into practice, as well as a
schedule for completion of legislation on intellectual property laws.
Perhaps the most important part of the plan calls for the establish-
ment of a central agency for the coordination of intellectual property
rights protection, which oversees the registration, administration, and
enforcement of matters concerning intellectual property rights.
With these efforts, Taiwan hoped the United States would re-
move it from the "priority watch list."57 The strategy of the United
States, however, has been to keep Taiwan under continuous pressure
and threat of Special 301 trade sanctions until Taiwan provides intel-
lectual property protection to the satisfaction of the United States.
After Taiwan passed the Cable Television Law, the United States de-
clared its satisfaction with Taiwan's effort to improve enforcement,
but refused to remove Taiwan from the "priority watch list."' 58
C. A Closer Look at Certain Issues
In order to get a flavor of the conflicts between Taiwan and the
United States over intellectual property protection, three issues that
have been controversial are given a closer look below. These exam-
ment problems in Taiwan and Taiwan needs to enact legislation to legitimize cable TV systems,
control copyright piracy by cable TV stations on Taiwan and eliminate piracy of video games."
Id.
55 Taiwan Optimistic on New Cable TV Law, But Foreign Ownership Ban Concerns U.S.,
Int'l Bus. and Fin. Daily (BNA) (July 29, 1993), available in NEXIS, World Library, ALLNWS
File.
56 Taiwan Announces Program to Improve Its Intellectual Property Rights Regime, 10 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1082 (June 30, 1993).
57 Several ministers of Taiwanese government said they would resign if the United States
should ignore Taiwan's efforts in protecting intellectual property rights and apply Special 301
sanctions on Taiwan. Taiwan Official Threatens to Resign if U.S. Launches Trade Retaliation,
BBC April 28, 1993, available in NEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
58 Taiwan; Intellectual Property: Taiwan Reacts to U.S. Decision to Keep "Priority Watch,"
BBC, Aug. 7, 1993, available in NEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
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pies suggest that the United States trade policy with the threat of Spe-
cial 301 has been particularly heavy-handed towards Taiwan.
1. Cable TV Law
Since 1989 the issue of piracy of American films has been on the
agenda of United States-Taiwan Special 301 negotiations. The United
States was concerned that underground cable networks in Taiwan
were showing American films without paying royalties. In the 1992
Memorandum of Understanding, Taiwan agreed to enact the Cable
Television Law.59 This law was rapidly passed in July 1993 after Tai-
wan was placed on the "priority watch list" in April 1993. According
to the law, Taiwan will be divided up into forty-eight different dis-
tricts, with each district allowed to have five stations.6 °
The controversy over the law lies in the fact that the cable televi-
sion network is part of the broadcasting/communication system, and
traditionally the regulation of the broadcasting/communication system
is strictly an internal affair, i.e., foreign nations have no right to
interfere.
2. Parallel Imports
Parallel import occurs when someone imports goods covered by
intellectual property rights into a region that is the designated terri-
tory of a distributor under a license agreement. In April 1993 Taiwan
passed a law which bans parallel import of genuine goods.6' Under
the law only the licensee of the copyright has the right to import the
works covered, and individuals are allowed to bring only one copy of
the copyrighted goods into the country. This stipulation, said United
States officials, is aimed at guarding the rights of copyright owners
while taking into account the interests of individual consumers. This
regulation was put into force on April 26, 1993. The result was chaos
at customs counters as agents tried to examine the luggage of incom-
ing passengers with great care.62
The provision restricting parallel imports is a controversial one,
especially since it is not included in the Berne Convention which is the
international standard for copyright. A ban on parallel imports is tan-
59 Memorandum of Understanding Between The Coordination Council For North American
Affairs and The American Institute in Taiwan, June 5, 1992 (on file with author).
60 Chamber of Commerce in Taipei Urges USTR Not to Use Special 301 Sanctions, 10 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1252 (July 28, 1993).
61 Jack C.C. Li, Taiwan: IPR Protection-How Far Should It Go?, BusrNEss TAIWAN, Aug. 2,
1993, available in NEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
62 Id.
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tamount to giving distributors a monopoly in the market. It distorts
free market competition to the detriment of consumers. In the Euro-
pean Community, restrictions on parallel imports is frowned upon,
and considered to hurt the community. The Taiwanese government
initially strongly opposed the adoption of such a provision. Under
pressure from the United States, however, this law was passed.63 As a
result, imports are becoming more expensive.
3. Pre-export Inspection System
On July 1, 1993, the Taiwanese government imposed a new pre-
export inspection system,64 according to the agreements in the Memo-
randum of Understanding reached between Taiwan and the United
States in 1992 after Taiwan was named a priority foreign country.
65
The pre-export inspection system covers computer software and re-
lated products, cosmetics, automobile parts, and sporting goods bear-
ing foreign trademarks. Exporters of such products have to register
with the Board of Foreign Trade and supply licensing documents from
the owners of any patents, trademarks or copyrights involved. As of
now Taiwan is the only country im the world that imposes such a pre-
export inspection system. This pre-export inspection requirement is
particularly troublesome for the computer industry, because of the po-
tential high costs and time delay caused by this requirement due to the
large numbers of patents, trademarks, and copyrights involved in the
products. Besides imposing an additional burden on customs, govern-
ment agencies, and exporters, the pre-export registration requirement
will shave the competitive advantage off the newly developed industry
of Taiwan.
Il. PROBLEMS WITH SPECIAL 301 AND GATr AS AN
ALTERNATIVE
A. Problems with Special 301
The review above of Taiwan's Special 301 experience, although
incomplete, indicates that the United States has applied Special 301 in
a rather heavy-handed fashion. Taiwan definitely feels that way, given
63 See infra notes 67-68.
64 Jack C.C. Li, Taiwan: IPR Protection-How Far Should It Go?, BusiNEss TAIWAN, Aug. 2,
1993.
65 Memorandum of Understanding Between The Coordination Council For North American
Affairs and The American Institute in Taiwan, June 5, 1992 (on file with author). See also U.S.,
Taiwan Reach Key Agreement on Patent, Trademarks, Copyrights, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1001
(June 10, 1992).
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the United States' insistence in negotiations on the creation of a spe-
cial police force and courts, the revision of elementary texts, and the
provision of treatment for United States nationals preferable to that
afforded Taiwanese citizens by their own legal system.66
There are several interrelated factors that contributed to this
heavy-handedness. The first, and perhaps the most important one, is
that the United States simply views an intellectual property system
that does not fully protect its intellectual property rights as the
equivalent to condoning piracy. The logic seems to be that if a coun-
try does not effectively protect United States intellectual property, the
intellectual property laws of that country must be changed to meet
United States standards. If that alone does not work, then some ad
hoc laws, regulations, and enforcement mechanisms must be put into
place. There is no consideration given to what intellectual property
system that country needs, or to the cost of maintaining a stringent
intellectual property system designed primarily to protect United
States intellectual property works.
The second factor is that in its eager pursuit of the goal of pro-
tecting intellectual property abroad, the USTR has paid scant atten-
tion to the possibility that it may be infringing upon the sovereignty of
other nations. Under Special 301, the USTR, influenced by private
United States interest groups,67 judges whether the laws and enforce-
ment of laws in another country are adequate. If they are not, that
country will be required to make changes under the threat of trade
sanctions. Due to uneven bargaining power, the political reality is
that Special 301 gives the USTR power to change laws of other coun-
tries.68 Serious resentment toward the United States has been gener-
66 William P. Alford, Forum: Taiwan and the GATT: Panel Three: Intellectual Property
Trade and Taiwan: A GATT-Fly's View, 1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 97, 100 (1992).
67 See, e.g., Taiwan attacked in U.S. Senate Hearing on Copyright, Central News Agency, Apr.
20, 1993, available in NEXIS. World Library, ALLWLD File. Eric Smith, executive director of
the International Intellectual Property Alliance, urged the United States government to employ
sanctions against Taiwan and Thailand and make them painful if they could not meet the de-
mands by the United States before the deadline. "If not, it is a sorry message we send our
trading partners that you can take seven or eight years to solve a problem before the United
States will act decisively." See also U.S. Copy Groups Praised USTR Action Against Taiwan,
Central News Agency, May 1, 1993.
68 The passage of Taiwan's Amendment to Copyright Law in April 1993 has caused great
controversy in Taiwan. The United States infringed on the legislative rights of Taiwan by draft-
ing a revised bill for the copyright law of Taiwan, then demanding it be enacted into law. DDP
Decided to Play Ball on Controversial Copyright Bills, China Economics News Service, April 21,
1993, available in NEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
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ated,69 and words like imperialism and colonist have been used to
describe the behavior of the United States.70 Although some may ar-
gue that what really matters is the availability of pressure and the will-
ingness to use it, it is simply naive for the United States to ignore the
full ramification of its intellectual property policy. Some may argue
that the United States is doing only what is needed to protect its own
legitimate rights, and that there is no reason for pirating countries to
complain. Besides failing to recognize issues concerning intellectual
property standards in different countries, this view ignores the extra-
territorial nature of a law like Special 301. When a country is forced
to do things, such as enacting new intellectual property laws, which its
citizens do not want, nationalism will inevitably be aroused. It is said
that in Thailand furor over a copyright amendment eventually led to
the dissolution of the Thai Parliament in April 1988. 1 Imagine how
Americans would feel if the United States were told by another coun-
try to fix its intellectual property law in six months.
Another factor is the attempt of the United States to stop piracy
of its intellectual property in other countries as soon as possible. In
rushing reforms, the United States has failed to consider that it nor-
mally takes a long time for a country to develop a strong and healthy
intellectual property system, and has not recognized the genuine ef-
forts made by other countries.72 Meaningful and enduring legal de-
velopment in intellectual property protection can only be achieved in
a country that has the right combination of social, economic and polit-
ical conditions to support a strong intellectual property protection sys-
tem. Some may point to Taiwan as an example of how pressure
discretely applied can achieve the desired result of intellectual prop-
erty protection. Pressure, however, was but one of a number of fac-
69 In the event mentioned in the previous note, the ruling Kuomintang (the Nationalist
Party) caucus issued a statement before the passage of the revisions to the Copyright Law, stat-
ing that "We are telling the United States that what it has asked from us not only violates our
interests but also our sovereignty.... For this, we are lodging our gravest protest." See id.
70 See William P. Alford, Intellectual Property, Trade and Taiwan: a GATT-Fly's View, 1992
CoLUm. Bus. L. REV. 97, 105 (1992), for Professor Alford's recount of his witnessing the audi-
ence of a lecture on Intellectual Property he gave in Taiwan express their anger at the United
States.
71 See Thai Government Falls in Dispute over U.S. Copyrights, UPI, Apr. 29, 1988, available
in NEXIS, World Library, UPI File.
72 It is of significance that the American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei, Taiwan withdrew
itself from its parent organization in the United States in protest against the United States' use
of § 301 trade sanctions as a threat against Taiwan. American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei's
Protest Ignored by U.S., Central News Agency, June 11, 1993, available in NEXIS, World Li-
brary, ALLWLD File. See also Chamber of Commerce in Taipei Urges USTR not to Use Special
301 Sanctions, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1252 (July 28, 1993).
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tors that led to changes in Taiwan's intellectual property law and
policy. Pressure would not work but for major economic, political,
and social changes already underway in Taiwan.
It may be argued that the pressure from the United States helps
to accelerate the development of a strong intellectual property system
in a developing country, which in turn helps that country to develop
its own technology and industry. The assumption behind this argu-
ment seems to be that the developing country either cannot plan for
its future economic growth or cannot make changes fast enough. That
could be the case in many less developed countries. It is not clear,
however, how valid that assumption is in the case of Taiwan. Taiwan
is aware of the importance of long term economic growth, and is capa-
ble of making long term economic plans. If its economic growth re-
quires improving its intellectual property system, more likely than not
Taiwan will do it even without external pressure. This is a point the
Taiwanese government stressed when it made recent modifications to
its intellectual property system.73
Even if we assume that pressure alone is enough to make a coun-
try create a strong intellectual property protection system, once the
pressure is lifted the system will also collapse. Therefore, in order to
maintain the level of intellectual property protection, the United
States can not stop threatening its trade partners with trade retalia-
tion. The question is for how long, and on how many countries at the
same time, can the United States maintain the necessary pressure? It
seems likely that continued application of such pressure will eventu-
ally backfire and prove harmful to the interest of the United States.
Furthermore, even if the United States can maintain high pressure on
other countries indefinitely, it is also perhaps not in the best interest
of the United States to be the sole policing force for worldwide intel-
lectual property protection. These considerations make it clear that
Special 301 cannot be relied upon as a long term solution.
Some may also argue that the United States has suffered signifi-
cant losses as the result of intellectual property piracy.74 Strong meas-
ures, therefore, should be taken. The validity of estimates of losses,
73 See Taiwan Government Seizes Illegal Videos, Laser Disks after U.S. Special 301 Action, 10
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 794 (May 12, 1993).
74 The International Intellectual Property Alliance estimates that United States film, pub-
lishing, music, software, and other industries that depend on copyrights lose $12-15 billion annu-
ally to piracy of their products outside the United States. Enforcement of Copyright Protection
Still Faulty, Subcommittee Told, 9 Int'l Trade Rep, (BNA) 1709 (Sept. 30, 1992).
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however, has been questioned.7 5 The estimated losses resulting from
piracy in foreign countries are usually calculated as the estimated
number of pirated copies sold times the United States price. This
method, however, neglects the economic reality. If the consumers can
only buy copyrighted goods at the United States price which is usually
several times higher than the price for a pirated copy, the volume of
sales has to shrink quite significantly.
Protecting United States intellectual property rights in foreign
countries is of great importance to the United States economy. The
United States is fully justified to request its trading partners to im-
prove their intellectual property systems so that United States intel-
lectual property rights can receive better protection. The problem is
in the means the United States has resorted to achieve this goal. The
root of the problems with Special 301 is in its unilateral nature. The
effectiveness of Special 301 is premised on the unequal bargaining
power between the negotiating parties. Facing the significant conse-
quence of a trade sanction, a country like Taiwan has no choice but to
concede to the requests of the United States. A powerful weapon like
Special 301, surely, is not completely without value. Used carefully, it
can achieve certain results without causing excessive damage. How-
ever, artful use requires awareness of the danger of abuse and the
willingness to exercise self-restraint. Not every United States Presi-
dent or USTR is willing to show careful self-restraint, of course.
While ex-USTR, Carla Hills, seemed to have taken a more careful
approach, at least in the beginning,76 the current USTR, Mickey Kan-
tor, expressly favors aggressiveness.77 If, as the Clinton Administra-
tion has claimed, the United States is going to use Special 301 more
aggressively, a heightened level of conflicts between the United States
and its trade partners can be expected.
There is, however, one definite positive effect of the aggressive
application of Special 301. Now that developing countries have been
75 See, eg., William P. Alford, Forum: Taiwan and the GATT: Panel Three: Intellectual prop-
erty, Trade and Tawan. a GATT-Fly's View, 1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 97, 99 (1992).
76 In 1989 and 1990, the USTR Carla Hills declined to name countries as "priority foreign
country." See Hills, Citing Significant Progress, Declines to Name Countries Under Special 301
Provision, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 616 (May 2, 1990).
77 The USTR Mickey Kantor told the Trade Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means
Committee that Special 301 has been a very valuable statute, but ultimately its credibility rests
on the United States' willingness to take strong action against those countries which contribute
to piracy, and that "we (USTR) are not going to shy away from our responsibility to protecting
U.S. intellectual property." U.S. Vows to Protect Intellectual Property Rights, Central News
Agency, April 22, 1993, available in NEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File. See also USTR Fact
Sheet on Special 301, Apr. 30, 1993, reprinted in 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 761 (May 5 1993).
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hit hard by Special 301, they may be willing to employ multilateral
means to resolve disputes over intellectual property protection.78
B. GATT as a Long Term Solution
Because a bilateral measure like Special 301 is not a good long
term solution for solving the problem of intellectual property piracy in
foreign countries, a multilateral measure is needed. One possibility,
as the United States has recognized, is to resolve intellectual property
issues through the GATT.79
The GATT is the most important international agreement regu-
lating trade among nations, with more than ninety countries, account-
ing for well over four-fifths of world trade, now subscribing to the
agreement.80 Because GATT lays down multilaterally agreed-upon
rules for the conduct of international trade, resolving disputes through
the GATT can potentially lessen the effects of uneven bargaining
power. Arbitration under GATT, in lieu of unilateral actions, would
provide both formality and the chance to take into account the needs
of the developing world. Although no one maintains that the GATT
has enjoyed a perfect record in dealing with departures from its basic
goals, it remains the only multinational organization with any kind of
track record in promoting the goal of free trade.81
The GATT is perceived to have certain advantages over other
multinational remedies in solving the problem of intellectual property
piracy. As a principle advantage, the GATT provides not only a fo-
rum for negotiations, but also an enforcement mechanism that does
not exist in traditional multilateral agreements. Although the dispute
settlement mechanism has produced mixed success, there is nothing
similar to it under the multilateral conventions.
Being discouraged by the World Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion's lack of effective enforcement mechanisms and inspired by
GATIT's recorded merits,82 the United States turned to the GATT as a
multilateral forum to pursue its trade-based intellectual property
rights interests. In order to achieve stronger enforcement of intellec-
78 Association of American Publisher Officials held that had the United States threatened its
trading partners more with Special 301, they would have come to the TRIPS table with more
goodwill. International Intellectual Property Alliance Targets 22 Countries for 'Special 301' Lists,
8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 274 (Feb. 20, 1991).
79 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
80 Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New
Multilateralism, 76 IowA L. REv. 273, 298 (1991).
81 Id. at 302.
82 See id. at 292-94, 299-301.
Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
15:206 (1994)
tual property rights, the United States insisted that the rules governing
these rights be incorporated in the GATT. The European Community
and Japan basically agreed with this position, and the consensus re-
sulted in the TRIPS negotiation in the Uruguay Round. In Novem-
ber, 1990, the Uruguay Round produced "The Draft Texts on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights" (Draft TRIPS).83
The recent conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations has
brought many major changes to the GATT.84 After seven years of
negotiation and two postponements, on December 15, 1993 the Uru-
guay Round finally came to conclusion and produced the Final Act.
This agreement is considered as the "largest, most comprehensive
trade agreement in world history. '85 According to the Final Act, a
new World Trade Organization (WTO) will be established as the suc-
cessor of the GATT.86 The WTO will pull together in a single frame-
work the GATT as it now exists, all arrangements concluded under
GATT auspices, and all other bodies emanating from the Uruguay
Round. The WTO will be run by a General Council, which will act as
a dispute settlement body. The existing GAT? dispute settlement
mechanism will also be strengthened.87
The Final Act also includes Agreement on Trade-Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).88 Thus, for the first
time, intellectual property agreements are incorporated into the
GATT. The Uruguay Round also provides for the establishment of a
Council for Trade Related Aspect of Intellectual Property Rights to
monitor all of these agreements.8 9 The provisions of Articles XXII
and XXIII of the GAIT 1994 apply to consultations and dispute set-
tlement under the TRIPS agreement.90
The general principles set out in TRIPS are the principles of na-
tional treatment and most-favored nation treatment.91 The TRIPS is
83 Mitsuo Matsushita, A Japanese Perspective on Intellectual Property Rights and the GATT,
1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 81, 83 n.6 (1992).
84 Uruguay Round Agreement is Reached; Clinton Notified Congress under Fast Track, 10
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2103 (Dec. 15, 1993).
85 Opinion of Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Chair of the President's Council of Economic Advi-
sors. Id.
86 Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization, Part II of the Final Act of
Uruguay Round negotiation.
87 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2 of
the Final Act of Uruguay Round negotiation.
88 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in
Counterfeit Goods, Annex 1C of the Final Act of Uruguay Round negotiation.
89 TRIPS art. 68.
90 TRIPS art. 64.
91 TRIPS arts. 3, 4.
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fairly comprehensive in its coverage of intellectual property rights.
Besides traditional intellectual property rights of copyright, trade-
mark, and patent, it also contains provisions on computer software
and integrated circuits. The intellectual property standards set forth
in TRIPS are fairly high. On copyright, it calls on countries to respect
the 1971 Berne Convention. z On patents, countries are to comply
with the 1967 Paris Convention, 93 and the term of patent protection is
twenty years.94 Member countries are also required to provide crimi-
nal procedures and penalties to be applied at least in cases of willful
trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale.95
Although the TRIPS sets high standards of intellectual property
rights, it does show consideration for less developed countries by al-
lowing for delay of implementation of those standards. Any develop-
ing country member is entitled to delay for five years. 96 Least-
developed country members, depending on their special situations,
may delay for ten years.97
As the original proponent for the incorporation of TRIPS into
the GATT, the United States should give its full support of the
TRIPS. The United States, therefore, should stop using Special 301,
because any further use of that bilateral measure will seriously under-
mine the effectiveness of the TRIPS. The United States has to learn
to be patient. Even with the incorporation of TRIPS into the GATT,
the goal of effectively resolving intellectual property protection issues
through the WTO will likely take a long time to achieve. The United
States also has to be ready to accept that the outcome of dispute reso-
lution through the WTO may not be as satisfactory as results possible
through Special 301 negotiations. 98 The United States, however,
should not be discouraged by those considerations so as to give up
pursuing the TRIPS/WTO route and continue aggressive Special 301
applications.99
92 TRIPS art. 9.
93 TRIPS art. 2.
94 TRIPS art. 33.
95 TRIPS art. 61.
96 TRIPS art. 65.
97 TRIPS art. 66.
98 See supra note 37 and accompanying text discussing the advantages of a bilateral
approach.
99 Even after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the USTR Mickey Kantor made sugges-
tion that the Clinton Administration might revive the Super 301, which expired in 1990, and use
it against Japan if current talks do not produce satisfactory results. See Japan Calls U.S. Trade
Threat 'Regrettable', L.A. TrMES, Jan.. 14, 1994, at D2.
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C. Taiwan and GATT
The Republic of China (ROC) was a founding member of the
GAIT.' 00 The ROC government gave notice of withdrawal from
GATT in 1950, after it retreated to Taiwan.' 10 In January of 1990 Tai-
wan applied for GATT membership. In order to avoid the issue of
Taiwan's political status, its application purported to be on behalf of
the "customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu."'102
This formulation is consistent with Art. XXXIII of the GATT, which
allows applications for membership to be filed by "governments acting
on behalf of a separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in
the conduct of its external commercial relations and of other matters
provided for in this agreement."
Accession to GATT is of great importance to Taiwan. Nine-
tenths of its trade is done without official ties, of which one-third is
with the United States. Except with the United States, Taiwan lacks
even a dialogue forum to resolve trade disputes. Being a non-GATT
state, Taiwan has no conduit to grieve against other countries who
deny it GATT's most favored nation treatment. Accession to the
GATT would instrumentally serve its security, for its membership
would simultaneously link it to more than a hundred economies. The
United States could aid Taiwan's accession to the GATT, and use its
influence in the process as a further incentive for Taiwan to cooperate
on intellectual property rights and other trade issues.' 3
IV. CONCLUSION
The piracy of intellectual property is a serious problem, not only
for the United States, but also for all producers of intellectual proper-
ties. Piracy, especially in developing countries, is hard to eliminate.
In order to protect its intellectual property rights in foreign countries,
the United States has launched a series of Special 301 attacks on
those pirating countries. While the United States should not be at-
tacked for wishing to protect its citizens' intellectual property rights,
the means it uses to achieve that end is problematic. As a bilateral
measure backed by unilateral retaliation, the Special 301 approach has
certain drawbacks. It can only be used as a short term solution. There
100 See Lori F. Samrosch, GATT Membership in a Changing World Order: Taiwan, China, and
the Former Soviet Republics, 1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 19, 21 (1992).
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 See U.S. Urges Taiwan to Cut Barriers to Trades as Part of GATT Accession, 10 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 2019 (Dec. 1, 1993).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 15:206 (1994)
is also the possibility of overly aggressive use, as demonstrated in the
case of Taiwan.
Strengthening intellectual property rights protection on a global
scale is not a simple trade problem. It inevitably involves interna-
tional politics. The case of Special 301 is just another example show-
ing that a multilateral means is often more desirable than a bilateral
means for resolving disputes between nations. At the risk of oversim-
plification, we can analogize the GATT (or the new WTO) to the vil-
lage council of a small village. Based upon a set of rules agreed upon
by most or all villagers, the village council adjudicates disputes be-
tween villagers. This mode of dispute resolution has the potential ad-
vantages of formality and equity. Use of bilateral negotiations
between nations to resolve disputes is comparable to the resolution of
disputes within the village by direct confrontation between villagers.
Direct confrontation as a way of dispute resolution has the potential
advantage of efficiency, but it always has the problem that the strong
will bully the weak. It also runs the risk of developing the dispute into
a family feud, especially when the parties have very different views of
the issue in dispute. Even though the two ways of dispute resolution
may result in exactly the same agreements between the parties, resort-
ing to the village council for a decision definitely adds legitimacy to
the outcome.
The Uruguay Round agreement, with the provision to establish
the World Trade Organization, may bring about significant changes to
the economic and political relationship among countries around the
world. The TRIPS covers an important area of the global economic
structure. It may take quite a few years before we can tell whether the
TRIPS is a successful way to resolve disputes over intellectual prop-
erty protection. It is clear, however, that the effectiveness of the
TRIPS depends on the effectiveness of the WTO. The effectiveness of
the WTO depends on whether powerful countries like the United
States can refrain from resorting to bilateral means under Special 301.
